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Unofficial Dollarisation and Monetary
Policy in Nigeria
Adamu, Y.*
Abstract
This paper examined the impact of dollarisation on monetary policy in Nigeria, using
monthly data spanning 2002 to 2016. The paper adopted the conventional IMF proxy for
dollarisation and traced its reactions to changing monetary policy stance. Using the
vector autoregression (VAR) model and interbank rate as an indicator of monetary
policy stance, the results showed that the size of dollarisation could influence the
outcome of monetary policy, though the impact was small. This was evident from the
output equations, that inflation did not respond in the first month and responded
negatively in the second month. However, from the third to sixth month, it responded
positively before it eventually returned to equilibrium. The overall impact of dollarisation
on exchange rate is dependent on the degree of dollarisation. The conclusion from the
results was that monetary policy could still be effective with the present level of
dollarisation.
Keywords: Dollarisation, Monetary Policy, Vector Autoregression
JEL Classification Numbers: C51, E52, E58

I.

Introduction

T

he central goal of monetary policy is to achieve price stability and ensure

rapid economic growth, among others. Acknowledging the size, timing,

direction, and persistence of monetary policy shocks on economic

activities provides the monetary authority the vital information required to finetune policy initiatives (CBN, 2014). Dollarisation has become a source of worry
for monetary policy because of its potential impact on the stability of the
financial system. It has been established that if a substantial part of the financial
system is officially or unofficially dollarised, it could create stability risks in the
form of either liquidity risk or solvency risk or both.
By definition, 'dollarisation' refers to the holding by residents of a significant
share of their assets in the form of foreign currency-denominated assets. It can
be official and unofficial dollarisation. It is official when the foreign currency is
* The author is a staff of the Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria. The usual disclaimer applies.
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given legal tender status, which implies that the foreign currency is adopted as
an official medium of exchange, as well as unit of account. Unofficial
dollarization, on the other hand, represents a case in which a foreign currency
is used alongside the domestic currency as means of exchange (Alvarez-Plata
&Garcia-Herero, 2007).
The extent of dollarization and its impact on monetary policy have continued
to generate debate in the literature. Circulation of a foreign currency, either as
a means of payment or as a store of value, is bound to affect the conduct of
monetary policy and, ultimately, the inflation outcome (Feige, 1997). In Nigeria,
under section 16 of the Central Bank Act 2007, the power to fix and determine
the exchange rate of the naira is exclusively vested in the Bank. By virtue of the
Act, currency notes and coins issued by the Bank shall be legal tender in Nigeria
at their face value for the payment of any amount. Under section 20(5) of the
Act, any person who refuses to accept the naira as a means of payment for
any amount in Nigeria is guilty of an offense and liable to be prosecuted, and if
found guilty shall be fined N50,000 or 6 months imprisonment.
In addition, many circulars had been issued by CBN, the latest Circular was
issued on April 17, 2015 with reference BSD/DIR/GEN/LAB/08/013 and titled
Currency Substitution and Dollarisation of the Nigerian Economy. In the
circular, the CBN condemned the development and reiterated that the naira
remains the only legal tender. The Bank also warned the banks and general
public that it was illegal to price or denominate the cost of any product or
service (visible or invisible) in any foreign currency, other than naira. Also, no
business offer or acceptance should be consummated in Nigeria in any other
currency.
The content of the Circular indicated that unofficial dollarisation is a serious
concern to the monetary authority, and makes the Nigerian economy
vulnerable to external shocks. It has been adjudged in some quarters as a
major factor largely explaining the depreciation of the domestic currency.
Unofficial dollarisation, which is the focus of this paper, is a reaction of
economic agents to a loss of value of a domestic currency, often resulting from
persistent inflation, devaluation or currency confiscation (Feige, 2002). It could
also be a result of an underground economy, since activities of this segment
are often concealed, hence, the appetite to transact in foreign currency. The
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preference for the use of a foreign currency gives consumers a hedge against
domestic inflation and enables savers to retain the value of their savings.
However, its effects can create distortions in the transmission mechanisms of
the monetary policy. This study examines the extent to which these distortions
could affect the efficacy of monetary policy in Nigeria. In other words, when
economic agents choose to voluntarily substitute a foreign currency for
domestic currency as a means of payment or choose to hold foreign rather
than domestic currency-denominated assets as a store of value, what would
be the impact on monetary policy?
The theoretical literature on monetary policy does not offer a clear answer as
to how dollarisation may affect monetary policy. The common view among
economists is that dollarisation makes monetary policy more complicated and
less effective (Alvarez-Plata and Garcia-Herrero, 2007). Monetary policy
effectiveness is important, since monetary policy instruments principally affect
domestic currency assets and liabilities. Another common view is that
dollarisation could result in a loss of seigniorage, which can be quite significant
in economies with growing money demand.
In the light of the above, the main objective of this paper, therefore, is to
examine the impact of distortions in monetary policy transmission mechanism
caused by the dollarisation. In other words, the study investigated the extent to
which dollarisation had impacted on monetary policy outcomes in Nigeria. The
paper also examined how dollarisation affected inflation and, in particular, the
pass-through effect from exchange rate to prices. The findings could be useful
to the Bank in achieving its price stability objective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviewed empirical
literature while Section 3 examined the data and presented some
developments. Section 4 focused on the methodology as well as explained the
data used for the study. Section 5 presented the empirical results, while Section
6 drew policy implications and concluded the paper.

II.

Literature Review

Literature has traditionally identified three consequences of dollarisation to
include: reduced monetary policy autonomy, limited last-minute creditor
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capacity, and the unfavorable mismatch of currencies resulting from
unhedged borrowers when the national currency depreciates. Though these
consequences are recognised by theory, existing empirical studies have
produced mixed results as to whether or not they are relevant in practice. The
concept of dollarisation has attracted controversial debates for some reasons,
including its impact on inflation performance and economic vulnerability. The
answer to whether and how dollarisation plays a role in influencing the
outcome of monetary policy is an aspect that has remained relatively
inadequate. To the best of my knowledge, only a few studies had empirically
investigated this subject in details, and the results were mixed.
Hausmann et al., (1999) opined that under a circumstance where de-facto
dollarisation became widespread, expansionary monetary policy could have
pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical consequences. This implied that
unofficial dollarisation would impede government efforts to employ
inflationary finance to impose implicit taxes on domestic monetary assets.
Inferring from this assertion, information on the extent of de-facto dollarisation
would be a critical input into the monetary policy decision, since extensive
unofficial dollarization was likely to make monetary policy less effective and
active exchange rate intervention more dangerous. Levy (2006) noted that
financially dollarised economies, tended to exhibit higher inflation rates, higher
tendency to suffer from banking crises and slower and more impulsive output
growth. De Nicoló et al., (2003) found similar results, which showed that
financial instability was probably higher in dollar-dominated economies.
Honohan and Shi (2001) showed that greater dollarisation was associated with
a greater pass-through from exchange rate changes to consumer prices,
thereby potentially increasing nominal risk in the economy. Bordo et al., (2009)
investigated the long-run evidence of the impact of foreign currency debt on
growth and found that a higher share of foreign currency debt to total debt
was associated with an increased risk of currency and debt crises, which
themselves resulted in significant permanent output losses. Cheng and Wang
(2011) contended that dollarisation was a form of neo-colonialism.
On the other side of the debate, Arteta (2003) found marginal evidence that
significant levels of dollarisation increased the risk of bank crises or currency
disruption. Currency disruption would probably not be greater in high-dollar
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countries but instead be based on macroeconomic policies. Berg and
Borensztein (2000) examined the experience of five dollarised countries, to find
which monetary aggregates appear to have the closest connection to future
inflation. The study found that a broader monetary aggregate that included
foreign currency deposits was superior to one that did not. Rheinhart, Rogoff
and Savastano (2003) found that partial dollarisation had a limited impact on
the effectiveness of monetary policy, and that output fluctuations were quite
similar in countries with different degrees and varieties of dollarisation.

III.

Dollarisation and Monetary Policy in Nigeria

A parallel circulation of a foreign currency is likely to affect the conduct of
monetary policy and, ultimately, the inflation outcome. The index of
dollarisation in Nigeria has, on the average, maintained, a smooth upward
trend throughout the observed period. As shown in Figure 1, the index of
dollarisation was 4.8 in January 2002, rose to 25.3 in March 2005 but declined to
19.3 in December 2006. The movement in the interbank rate was, however, not
too smooth, as observed in the case of the dollarisation. The interbank rate was
23.9 per cent in January 2002. It declined to 14.1 per cent by December 2002
and rose to 25.7 per cent in December 2003. The interbank rate also declined to
12.1 per cent in January 2004 and further fell to 3.8 per cent in August 2005, but
rose to 27.1 per cent in January 2006 before declining to 1.1 per cent in April
2006. The fluctuations continued throughout the observed period, peaking at
36.4 per cent in October 2016.
Dollarisation typically has been a reaction to economic instability and high
inflation. Small amount of foreign currency holdings is supposed to lead to
higher inflation, all things being equal. In January 2002, inflation stood at 18.6
per cent, while dollarisation was 4.8. Inflation fell in May 2002 to 10.2 per cent
while the dollarisation index rose to 5.7. In July 2006, when inflation fell to 3.0 per
cent, dollarisation index rose to 9.8. The inflation trend just like the interbank call
rate did not show a regular pattern across the observed period. It was 4.1 per
cent in September 2007 and rose to 15.1 per cent in December 2008, in
response to rising global food and fuel prices and the loosening of monetary
conditions. Prices also declined to 10.4 per cent in September 2009 and to 9.4
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per cent in July 2011. The declining trend continued in November 2014 with a
7.9 per cent decrease, but later rose to 18.6 per cent in December 2016.
Figure 1: Dollarisation and Monetary Policy

However, the dollarisation index maintained an upward trend on average
throughout the observed period with the lowest point of 4.8 in January 2002,
and rose to a peak of 26.2 in February 2015
Figure 2: Dollarisation and Inflation

In Figure 3, the dollarisation showed a pattern of upward trend from January
2002 to February 2015 before it started declining. For the exchange rate, it
appears there was no sign of trends. The observed behaviour of the exchange
may be due to the exchange rate regime operating during the periods.
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Figure 3: Dollarisation and Exchange Rate

IV.

Methodology

IV.1

Data

The data employed were monthly data spanning 2002 to 2016. The variables of
interest were the index of dollarisation, monetary policy rate- proxied by
interbank rate, the naira-dollar exchange rate and inflation rate. The main
source of data is the CBN statistical bulletin. The index of dollarisation was
computed as the ratio of foreign currency supply to the broad money supply.
Foreign currency deposit is the traditional proxy for the measurement of
dollarisation in an economy. According to Feige (2002), the traditional
dollorisation index woulx be an adequate proxy of unofficial dollarisation
when, foreign currency holdings were of marginal importance or when the
foreign currency in circulation and foreign currency deposit were highly
complementary.
Most literature and institutions, like the IMF, used the traditional index to proxy
the extent of foreign currency in an economy. The ideal proxy should include
both the foreign currency deposit and the foreign currency in circulation.
However, data on the latter are very difficult to obtain in Nigeria. For exchange
rate, the official rate was employed as against the Bureau De-Change (BDC)
where transactions were speculative in nature. The inflation variable was used
as an indicator of the general price level, while the interbank call rate was
employed to proxy monetary policy. The monetary policy rate (MPR) is an
anchor rate, as well as the operating range or band of overnight interest rates
in the money market. However, its lumpy nature did not readily capture the
market dynamics, hence the use of the interbank call rate as a proxy for MPR.
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In examining the properties of the data, unit root tests were conducted and the
results indicated that all the variables were stationary at levels, except for the
exchange rate variable which was stationary at first difference (Appendix 1).

IV.2

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 was based on 174 observations (after adjustment), hence providing a
more precise estimate of the parameters. The variables presented a positive
mean for all series with interbank rate having a mean of 11.80 and standard
deviation of 6.71. The dollarisation index (DI) showed a mean of 13.27 with a
standard deviation of 6.02. The Jarque-Bera statistics confirms that the null
hypothesis of the variables should not be rejected and that the variables are
normally distributed. As shown in the table below: DI stands for index of
dollarization, IBR-Inter Bank Rate, INF-Inflation Rate, and DEXR-Exchange Rate.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability

DI
13.26609
13.02049
26.18879
5.057444
6.019655
0.410046
1.830140
14.79813
0.000612

IBR
11.80460
10.68000
36.42000
0.770000
6.713486
1.077628
4.728909
55.34836
0.000000

INF
11.66138
10.99500
28.21000
3.000000
4.558580
1.020001
4.363961
43.65946
0.000000

DEXR
1.087989
-0.010000
62.81000
-4.500000
6.075554
7.322641
68.04152
32225.40
0.000000

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.
Observations

2308.300
6268.870
174

2054.000
7797.266
174

2029.080
3595.053
174

189.3100
6385.838
174

IV.3

The Model

In order to capture the real-time effects of policy actions and avoid the
freezing of innovations in some variables, the study used the vector
autoregression (VAR) models which have the power to avert theoretical
assumptions in modern monetary policy analysis. The dependence on the
propagation of impulses through the error term also makes VAR models more
reliable – the unexplained term is the source of shock to the system.
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A major requirement for the estimation of a VAR model is the choice of an
appropriate lag length. The Final Prediction Error (FPE), Schwarz Information
Criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion, selected an optimal
lag length of 3, which was employed in the study (Appendix 3). As part of the
diagnostic test, a stability test was undertaken to ascertain the reliability of the
VAR model using the autoregressive (AR) root stability test. The estimated VARs
proved to be stable, since all roots indicated a modulus of less than one and lie
inside the unit circle (Appendix 1).

IV.4

Model Specification

In a VAR model, each variable is expressed as a function of its own lags and the
lags of other variables in the system. The general specification is as follows:

The specification for this model follows the general framework of the VAR which
constituted four variables in this paper, namely: index of dollarization (DI),
interbank interest rate (IBR), inflation rate (INF) and exchange rate changes
(DEXR).
Where
and INF.

represent the vector of the four endogeneous variables DI, IBR, DEXR,
is the vector of equation specific constant while

is the vector of

error terms, or innovations (shocks) to the four variables. In matrix form the
equations is stated as below:

In terms of ordering, the index of dollarisation entered first because the central
bank is expected to monetise its flows as it intervenes in the foreign exchange
market. The interbank rate is next since the money market is expected to
respond to increase in money stock. This also affects the exchange rate, which
makes it come next in the model. Inflation entered last because it is expected
to react to interest rate and exchange rate.
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V.

Analysis of Results

V.1

Impulse Response Analysis

June 2017

Impulse response functions (IRF) are structured such that they trace the effects
of any shock, represented by the error term of the concerned equation, on the
future values of the dependent variable in that equation and those in the other
equations. In this paper, the impulse response function was applied to identify
the impact of dollarisation on monetary policy in Nigeria. From the results
shown in Figure 4, IRF revealed that given a one standard deviation innovation,
d ol l a ri s a ti on d oes not a f f ec t the outc om e of m oneta ry p ol i c y
contemporaneously. In the second month, inflation declined by 0.04 per cent,
while interbank rate and exchange increased by 0.07, and 0.9 per cent,
respectively.
However, in the third month, inflation turned positive increasing by 0.14 per
cent. The interbank rate also increased in the third month by 0.05 per cent,
while the exchange rate turned negative by 0.32 per cent. The sign on the
response of the monetary policy in the fourth month was negative, which was
reversed in the fifth month. From the fifth month to the tenth month, the sign of
the monetary policy stays negative. The fourth month decline in the monetary
policy rate is a sign of slow impact of increasing dollarisation on monetary
policy because short term rates are expected to respond rapidly. In the case
of prices, the increase in dollarisation resulted to an increase in inflation for the
third month, which lasted until the sixth month before it reversed to decreasing
trend up to the tenth month. For the exchange rate, aside the deprecation
experienced in the second, third, and the fifth month, the other months were
appreciations due to increasing dollarisation in the economy. In summary, the
results suggested a small impact in terms of a reduction in the degree of
dollarisation despite tight monetary policies.
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Figure 4: Impulses of Dollarisation Graph

V.2

Variance Decomposition Analysis

The VAR system was estimated to isolate the variation of each endogenous
variable that was due to shocks in each component. In doing this, the
significance of each random shocks, relative to the others, was ascertained.
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis (in Table 1) revealed
that shocks to index of dollarisation accounted for only 0.02 per cent of the
variation in the growth of inflation at the first period and settles at 0.09 per cent
by the end of the tenth month. Shocks to dollarisation generated 13.2 per cent
variation in exchange rate in the first month, which gradually increased and
settled at 22.0 per cent by the tenth month. This position was implied by the
impulse response analysis where the real exchange rate changed significantly
in response to an impulse from dollarisation. Moreover, the reaction of
monetary policy rate to the index of dollarisation was marginal in the first month
at about 0.38 per cent and rose slowly afterwards to 0.58 per cent by the tenth
month. This is, however, contrary to a priori expectation. Lastly, the impact of an
own shock to dollarisation was 86.4 and 77.4 per cent in the first month and
tenth month, respectively.
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Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of Index of
Dollarisation
Decomposition of DI
Period

S.E.

INF

DEXR

IBR

DI

1

1.937706

0.018421

13.16931

0.383683

86.42859

-0.86133

-5.07672

-1.18586

-5.20356

0.014111

16.56079

0.227999

83.1971

-1.00704

-6.39668

-0.96056

-6.62822

0.019404

20.13507

0.952784

78.89274

-1.40431

-7.91117

-1.40195

-7.91487

0.01837

21.41309

0.925329

77.64321

-1.80297

-8.81279

-1.41453

-8.82057

0.015504

21.34178

0.854729

77.78799

-2.04681

-9.25841

-1.40465

-9.3414

0.021744

21.59922

0.757814

77.62122

-2.36204

-9.74493

-1.39969

-9.90176

0.031489

21.9486

0.68418

77.33573

-2.76745

-10.18

-1.46228

-10.4116

0.045024

22.11069

0.626116

77.21817

-3.22116

-10.5078

-1.56546

-10.8255

0.064119

22.07307

0.57807

77.28474

-3.70929

-10.7506

-1.701

-11.1604

0.090531

21.95823

0.535623

77.41562

-4.21726

-10.9349

-1.85514

-11.4426

2

2.858011

3

3.439461

4

3.806247

5

4.065632

6

4.255148

7

4.389678

8

4.485103

9

4.553871

10

4.604013

VI.

Policy Implications and Conclusion

VI.1

Policy Implications
I.

From the findings, monetary policy could still be effective even
with the current level of unofficial dollarisation in the Nigerian
economy, since the impact was small.

ii.

Furthermore, the results indicated that reaction of the index of
dollarisation to changes in monetary policy stance was
marginal, in terms of percentage. This development might be
because the level of dollarisation that could have influenced
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monetary policy was largely from the foreign currency in
circulation rather than foreign currency deposit with domestic
banks.
iii.

The results may also suggest that monetary policy could still be
effective in influencing domestic transactions in part because
these have remained predominantly in domestic currency and
dollarisation may reflect primarily asset substitution and foreign
exchange in circulation.

iv.

The study also showed that there was no regular pattern in the
response of the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks.

VI.2

Conclusion

This paper examined the impact of dollarisation on monetary policy in Nigeria.
The paper adopted the conventional IMF proxy for dollarisation and traced its
reactions to changing monetary policy stance. Using the vector
autoregression (VAR) model and interbank rate as an indicator of monetary
policy stance, the results showed that the size of dollarisation could influence
the outcome of monetary policy, though the impact was small. This was
evident from the output equations, that inflation did not respond in the first
month and responded negatively in the second month. However, from the
third to sixth month, it responded positively before it eventually returned to
equilibrium. The overall impact of dollarisation on exchange rate is dependent
on the degree of dollarisation. The conclusion from the results was that
monetary policy could still be effective with the present level of dollarisation.
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Appendix

VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: INF DEXR IBR DI
Exogenous variables: C
Sample: 2002M01 2016M12
Included observations: 158
Lag

LogL

LR

FPE

AIC

SC

HQ

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

-1978.142
-1518.423
-1483.972
-1467.352
-1456.602
-1447.053
-1431.229
-1417.534
-1413.467

NA
890.3425
64.97638
30.50432
19.18762
16.55899
26.64156*
22.36261
6.433958

926246.4
3368.689
2668.140
2649.938*
2837.260
3087.882
3108.379
3220.011
3775.629

25.09040
19.47370
19.24015
19.23231*
19.29876
19.38042
19.38264
19.41182
19.56288

25.16794
19.86137*
19.93796
20.24025
20.61684
21.00864
21.32099
21.66031
22.12150

25.12189
19.63114
19.52354*
19.64165
19.83405
20.04166
20.16983
20.32496
20.60197

* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modied LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
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VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Date: 06/23/17 Time: 14:52
Sample: 2002M01 2016M12
Included observations: 168

Dependent variable: INF
Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

DEXR
IBR
DI

5.646203
1.472770
2.031632

3
3
3

0.1302
0.6886
0.5659

All

8.541751

9

0.4806

Dependent variable: DEXR
Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

INF
IBR
DI

4.554062
4.857251
12.96441

3
3
3

0.2075
0.1826
0.0047

All

22.27325

9

0.0081

Dependent variable: IBR
Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

INF
DEXR
DI

0.432885
10.16938
0.311650

3
3
3

0.9334
0.0172
0.9578

All

12.22786

9

0.2008

June 2017
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Dependent variable: DI
Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

INF
DEXR
IBR

0.212180
1.656708
3.618817

3
3
3

0.9756
0.6466
0.3057

All

7.268614

9

0.6092

Group unit root test: Summary
Series: DI, IBR, DEXR, INF
Date: 06/23/17 Time: 14:55
Sample: 2002M01 2016M12
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 2
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-1.56267 0.0591
4
703
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W stat
-5.43551 0.0000
4
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
57.3954 0.0000
4
PP - Fisher Chi-square
86.8449 0.0000
4

703
703
709

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality

